The Metametaphysics volume I started reading has this nice description of the project:
Metametaphysics is concerned with the foundations of metaphysics. It asks: Do the questions of metaphysics really have answers? If so, are these answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? And what is the best procedure for arriving at them—common sense? Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria? 
So naturally I ask – will investigating the legitimacy of investigating the legitimacy of metaphysics then produce another “meta” discourse? Meta-metametaphysics?
The entire introduction, however, leaves the following impression about the present objectological attempts to make some sort of “speculative turn” and talk about objects that, apparently, no one noticed until today – only in the continental circles would such discussions be taken seriously as “novel”! There is an inherent disingenuity in presenting your “discoveries” as new when an entire field already exists that deals with the very same issues.