Maimon Reading Group: Chapter 1.

Although this chapter is rather short, I have to admit that it is rather dense – not necessarily in terms of being obscure or incomprehensible, but in terms of requiring a rather extensive amount of context (Kant and Leibniz, for example). So I spent most of the my weekend rereading sections from the first Critique and only a brave act of discipline stopped me from rereading Leibniz-Clarke correspondence.* What follows are some remarks on Chapter 1 that, I hope, can help us pose initial questions regarding Maimon’s Essay. I am mostly looking forward to trying to parse this chapter and so any help would be not only welcome, but necessary. I will therefore provide only a rather general outline of the discussion and ask some question that I’d like to clarify for myself (and hopefully others).

I’d like to begin with a few short remarks about Maimon’s take on some of the essential Kantian doctrines. Hopefully it will allow for a better understanding of what he is trying to argue in Chapter 1 vis-a-vis space/time being both intuitions and concepts.

Maimon’s main issue with Kant seems to be the distinction between intuitions and concepts (and the milage that Kant gets out it), or, to put it differently, not with the distinction itself (we could, say, introduce the distinction as a purely methodological tool) but rather with the implied dualism between the sensibility and the understanding. This distinction is between object’s being given to us (intuitions being representations by means of which objects are given to us – sensibility) and object’s being thought about (concepts being that by means of which we think about objects – understanding). This distinction sets up Kant’s analysis of cognition as essentially a synthetic activity of subsuming intuitions under concepts – as many have pointed out, in this sense the demonstration (“deduction”) of how a posteriori intuitions are subsumed under a priori concepts (categories) is the heart of Kant’s argument. In terms of Maimon’s chapter 1, it seems appropriate to mention that, for Kant, as far as his analysis of experience is concerned, sensibility gives us space/time (forms of sensibility) and understanding gives us the categories (forms of understanding).

What Thielke then labels Maimon’s Challenge is the following:

“Kant’s critical idealism rests upon an unwarranted and unstable foundation claim about the nature of cognition…  It must be emphasized that, however, that behind the discussion of space and time lies the more central issues of the heterogeneity of the faculties [of sensibility and understanding]… At stake is the question of whether separate faculties can nevertheless interact so as to produce experience..” [Thielke, 89-90]

If Maimon’s task is to overcome Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding, then it is clear that in Chapter 1 he goes about it by first challenging Kant’s discussion of space/time. Space/time are not non-conceptual forms of sensibility, but are minimal conceptual conditions for thinking about objects. The reason we think of space/time as intuitions is their misrepresentation by imagination. Maimon’s actual conceptualization of experience in terms of differentials will take place later in the Essay.  All I’d like to do here (hopefully to start thinking about the importance of these issues not simply for our understanding of Kant and German Idealism, but also for our current philosophical attempts to deal with similar issues).

1. The opening of the chapter rehearses some well-known Kantian postulates: “a limited cognitive faculty” is divided into two parts – matter and form; matter is the particular of the object (intuition/sensibility) and form is the universal (concept/understanding). Form of sensibility allows us to establish a particular relation to a particular object, while form of understanding allows for a conceptual relation to objects in general. The nature of cognition is, again with Kant, that of “ordering manifold in time and space” [11/13]. Maimon’s in agreement with Kant regarding the a priori nature of space/time as well. Space/time as forms of sensibility then are dealt with in Chapter 1 while their connection with the forms of understanding is promised for Chapter 2.

2. Again, Maimon’s initial description of space/time is not very different from that of Kant: “Space and time are not concepts abstracted from experience because they are not constituent parts of experiential concepts: that is, they are not the manifold, but rather the unities through which the manifold of experiential concepts is gathered together.” [12/14] A bit further Maimon writes: “So what are space and time? Kant asserts that they are the forms of our sensibility, and here I am of completely the same opinion as him.” [13/15] However, Maimon’s addition in the next sentence proposes to understand space/time in a way that is different from Kant.

3. Maimon’s short “deduction” here begins with the assumption that the condition of any thought/thinking is “unity in the manifold”: if A and B are completely identical, there is no manifold to unify, therefore no thought, however, if A and B are completely different, there is no possibility of unity and therefore no comparison, and no thought. [13/15]  Space and time then are “these special forms by means of which unity in the manifold of sensible objects is possible, and hence by means of which these objects themselves are possible as objects of our consciousness.” [13/16]

4. The most puzzling statement, in terms of Kant’s philosophy, about the nature of space and time come a bit later (after a short discussion of how positing time cancels space and positing space cancels time): “Space and time are as much concepts as intuitions, and the latter presuppose the former.” [14/18] That “the latter presupposes the former” might not be as controversial for Kant, but suggesting that space/time are not a priori forms of intuition but concepts is certainly going against Kant in a big way. Maimon’s explanation is simple and elegant: if space and time are “special forms” that make the unity in the manifold possible, then, being “the sensible representation of the difference between determined things,” they aid in the unifying the manifold and are concepts. Space and time are both intuitions and concepts – as intuitions they are “mere forms of sensibility,” as concepts they are forms of “all transcendental cognition in general.” [179/347, note 9]

If Kant distinguishes between the forms of sensibility (intuitions) and the forms of understanding (concepts), then Maimon claims that, being both intuitions and concepts, “representations of space and time have just the same degree of reality as the pure concepts of the understanding or categories; and that therefore what can rightly be maintained of one can also be maintained of the other.” [17/22]

5. Even though it seemed, in the beginning of the chapter, that Maimon’s goal is to introduce his understanding of space/time as concepts in addition to Kant’s description of them as intuitions, the chapter ends with Maimon stating that, based on his presentation, space/time can only be called “empirical intuitions (as predicates of intuitions) and not pure intuitions,” which goes against Kant. [18/26] So, in a sense, Chapter 1 attempts to disprove Kant’s point that space/time are a priori forms of intuition and claims that space/time are concepts (of “being-apart” and “preceding/succeeding”).**

Clearly Maimon begins the Essay with a discussion of space and time for the same reasons that Kant does so in the first Critique, and yet Maimon’s conclusions seem to be based on Kantian assumptions about the nature of cognition and produce strikingly different results. Space and time are concepts of relation, not extension. As much as it looks like a defense of Leibniz’s position, Thielke argues that “Maimon’s account does not claim that space and time – nor indeed the objects that fill them – are simply unclear or confused concepts.  Space is not an empirical concept, nor is it abstracted from conceptual difference.  Rather, space stands as a condition on the possibility of representing difference as a form of the particular images provided by the imagination. In this light, Maimon can, like Kant, be viewed as advancing the transcendental explanation of space.  Each maintains that space provides the form under which the representation of an individual object is made possible; the debate between them centers on what type of form this is.” [Thielke, 98]

I’m going to leave this summary at this – I have plenty of questions about this chapter, so I might state some here and see I can get some help from other readers:

1) Judging by Maimon’s argument, such things as “pure intuitions” are not possible, or are they? If space and time are the only pure intuitions, according to Kant, then how does Maimon’s theory of space and time still a subset of transcendental philosophy as formulated by Kant? To put it differently, how transcendental is Maimon’s version of space/time as concepts?

2) I’m not sure I’m entirely clear about the whole business of “space/time as fiction” and so on. Both Midgley and Thielke give it some thought, but I wonder if a more clear presentation of that subject matter is possible.

3) If Maimon’s take on space and time is indeed transcendental enough, then how does essentially adding space/time among categories affect the general Kantian conceptual framework?

4) The discussion of difference as a special form is rather intriguing if not entirely clear in Chapter 1. Especially in Note 9 [178-179/344-347] where Maimon writes: “The form of identity refer to an objectum logicum, i.e. to an undetermined object, because every object in general is identical with itself. By contrast, the form of difference refers only to a real object, because it presupposes determinable objects… So the form of identity is the form of all thought in general (as well as the form of the merely logical); whereas the form of difference is the form of all real thought, and consequently an object of transcendental philosophy.” What is this business of “real objects” and “real thought”?

Of course, to limit the discussion to Chapter 1 here is an arbitrary decision and all of these issues/questions could be easily addressed in the context of the following chapters, but for now it seems fair to start with small problems and move onto large ones. I’m itching to reread Transcendental Aesthetics once again, but it would have to do for the initial post – hopefully we will have plenty of opportunities to go back to Kant in the following weeks, but clearly Maimon’s philosophical contribution goes well beyond his peculiar interpretation of Kantian philosophy, so I’ll try and resist the temptation to always go back to Kant and “compare/contrast” him with Maimon.

* Leibniz-Clark correspondence deals with the issues of absolute vs. relational time/space and, as a debate, is essential to situate both Kant’s and Maimon’s arguments. Also see Peter Thielke’s essay “Intuition and Diversity: Kant and Maimon on Space and Time,” in Freudenthal, ed. Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic, 89-124 and Nick Midgley’s “Introduction to the Translation,” xxxvi-xxxix.

** Nick Midgley addresses this issue on xxxvii of the Introduction (unless I’m completely missing it).

17 thoughts on “Maimon Reading Group: Chapter 1.

  1. Thielke essay you mention addresses some of the questions related to “space as fiction” but a lot of his discussion is based on Maimon’s books not available in English, so maybe it would be good to summarize his (and Atlas’) presentations as the reading develops.

    If Nick Midgley’s around, judging by his comprehensive introduction, he could certainly be a suitable candidate for a kind of “author’s perspective” we had last year when Lee Braver participated in the reading group of his books.

    However, I agree with you that many of these questions will be addressed and explain in the later chapters, so raising them now might get the ball rolling.

  2. Many of these things get addressed in Chapter 2 (which is long), but I didn’t want to encroach on Jon’s territory. I think dedicating a week to a chapter is about right as far as I am concerned – enough time to read it many times and read some secondary sources to make sense (plus, all that sitting and staring into the void, of course)…

  3. Pingback: Maimon Reading Group (Summer 2010) « Perverse Egalitarianism

  4. The “unity in the manifold” issue seems to me very close to the heart of the problem. If A=B, no issue arises; if A≠B, then no issue arises either. But the issue does arise! So space & time turn out to be a kind of mediation between identity and difference. We are always thinking the same damn questions. Plus ca change…

  5. I also find the discussion of space/time with the issues of identity/difference to be quite unusual. If space, for example, is not an independently existing object (absolute space), but a concept (like, say, cause), then in the same way I ask “what caused that?” I can ask “what spaced this?” right?

    Or to put it differently, for Kant space/time are forms of intuition and therefore deal with the way objects are being given, therefore are part of sensibility (and therefore are discussed in Aesthetics) and are, in a way, passive. For Maimon, they are concepts and therefore deal with the way we think (about) objects, and therefore active and their conceptual activity of “timing” and “spacing” the object/worlds.

  6. Thanks for doing this (post and reading group) and thanks to the people who organized the translation effort. I think most of these texts remain untranslated because there’s no interest in reading them in class (and, of course, there is no interest in reading them because they are not available in English).

    I wonder if I can run this by you guys:

    So clearly Kant’s real achievement in the first critique (and his discussion of space and time indicate that as well) is, among many other things, a complete rethinking of the subject-object relationship in the following way: before Kant, we could easily speak of “subjects” relating to “objects” (empiricism described it one way, rationalism another way), but after Kant we certainly have realized that in order to do so, we must have a point of reference outside of both subjects and objects (God’s point of view, if you will) and, having no such place/point, we must forever abandon the metaphysical project of figuring out the relationship between “I” or “I think” or “subject” or “self” etc etc and the objects/things/world. So the revolution here is not (maybe as Kant himself believed) about the methodology of reversing the relationship between subjects and objects, but in the very destruction of the “outside point of reference” that such a reversal would inevitably assume.

    Now, Maimon, I think, sensed the true revolutionary character of Kant’s critical philosophy, even though, one might argue, Kant himself did not (at least not all the way). The distinction between the subject and the objects it perceives and thinks is not the traditional distinction between subjects (us) and objects (things), it is a new distinction between sensibility/intuition and understanding/concepts. Where Kant went wrong, Maimon seems to suggest, is in transferring the distinction between “inside me” and “outside world” onto his own distinctin between the qualitatively different functions of “sensibility” and “understanding” as “outside” and “inside”. Therefore, Maimon’s critique of Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts then is a critique of this very distinction between “outside” and “inside” – it is a flattening out of not only the discredited distinction between thought and being (we can’t access being but through thought, so we can’t compare or, here comes the fashionable word, correlate them). There’s no inside (concepts) and outside (intuition), there’s a flat plane (let’s use Deleuze here) on which both intutions and concepts are placed, they are different but they are no longer qualitatively distinct. Therefore, it is easy to imagine how in this situation space and time could be both intuitions and concepts, performing different functions as intuitions and as concepts.

    How does that sound?

    • Mike,

      Yeah that sounds right to me. Beiser or somebody (it might be Atlas) claims that it is clear that Hegel actually read Maimon, because some of the wording in stating the doctrines is too similar. My knowledge of Hegel is shamefully limited, but the way you’ve spieled things here seems to make sense of how Maimon could lead to Hegel.

      Perhaps more tendentious, this bit seemed pretty Hegelian to me too:

      “I also note that each of these forms on its own is insufficient, and that both of them are necessary for this purpose, but not in the sense that positing one necessitates positing the other; but rather the reverse, namely, that positing one necessitates canceling out the other in the very same objects. So positing one necessitates positing the other in general, because otherwise it would not be possible to represent (as a mere negation) the canceling out of the other. I will explain this point more precisely. Space is the being-apart of objects (being in one and the same place is not a determination of space, but rather its cancellation). So if we are to imagine things in space, that is, outside one other, we must imagine them simultaneously, that is, in one and the same point in time (because the relation of separateness is an indivisible unity). If we want to imagine things in temporal succession, one after the other, then we must imagine them in one and the same place (because otherwise we would have to imagine them at one and the same point in time) (17)”

      So you have one concept presupposing another because making sense of the first concept involves circumstances which include the negation of applications of the second concept. This is a paradigm instance of at least the kind of cartoon Hegel I learned as an undergraduate.

  7. Mikhail,

    Jeez you’ve set the bar really high! That’s the clearest exposition of what’s going on in Chapter One that I’ve seen in any of the literature I’ve been digging into. I’m going to go redouble effort on Chapter 2 notes. Hopefully some of the questions at the end will be addressed.


    • Second chapter is pretty long and dense, but I think we can definitely tackle it. I feel that reading and rereading the Essay really helps to get all points together, but it’s by no means the clearest presentation. I’ve got Maimon’s Logic and I was trying to read bits on related topics (I thought I saw it online available as well, I need to take another look) – it’s much clearer and better organized.

      • Yes– in reading some of the secondary lit, I have found myself wishing the Logic would get translated next. (Well, I’d also love to see his Hebrew work, esp his early kabbalistic book and his Maimonides commentary, but I’m guessing there’s even less popular demand for these…. call me crazy…)

  8. Hello to everyone. I would first like to say how pleased I am that this reading group is happening so immediately upon the publication of the translation. As a translator it is very rewarding to know that it is being read, but also having come to love Maimon as a thinker it is good to participate in a righting of that neglect that, according to Fichte, he already suffered in his own lifetime.

    Before coming to Chapter 1, a hermeneutic concern. The problem of the consistency of the Essay itself and its multiple appendages is a bottomless one. I was interested in what Shahar had to say about Midrash in his post; at times Maimon makes me think of Zen, and that as long as I keep asking him, ‘yes but what do you really think is the truth, master’ he will keep hitting me with his stick – so maybe we should approach the text with a different question. As I and others have said, Gideon Freudenthal raises this issue very well in his introductory essay to the 2003 Maimon conference papers, and Maimon himself spoke of valuing truth above system in a letter to Reinhold. A different response to the problem of consistency is to be found in GF’s wonderful and more recent Definition and Construction: SM’s Philosophy of Geometry (no. 317, PDF) This involves a very careful attempt to bring more consistency to the Essay and its appendages by mapping different parts to different Maimons of the year 1789 (Maimon before he received Kant’s criticisms and Maimon afterwards, the endnotes for example representing a later and more sceptical Maimon than the text they supplement). A virtue of reading groups is to allow close reading, for this reason I think we shouldn’t be over-concerned about the consistency of the Essay, but rather allow each thought to resonate with its full force; what is important is to try to elicit what is radical and novel in Maimon, to get at the challenge he poses to Kant and above all his provocation to rethink Kant.

    There follow a few remarks on Chapter 1:

    1. ‘form or that for which [das wofuer] the object is to be cognized’ (s.12)
    This ‘wofuer’ with which Maimon opens his discussion of the forms of sensibility may be worthy of comment. When we first read it we thought ‘is it a misprint for ‘wodurch?’, perhaps because of coming to Maimon from CPR we thought ‘the matter is what is cognized and surely the forms are that through which it is cognized’. We wrote a footnote suggesting it might be a mistake, but on reflection we thought, no, there may be something substantive at stake here, Maimon is thinking of the form as the knower and the matter as what is known. Maimon’s critique of pure intuition involves an insistence on the exclusive disjunction of passive empirical intuition and active conceptual form.

    2. “The form of sensibility takes what would, without that form, be outside the cognitive faculty (the real in sensation) and makes it present within that faculty; whereas the understanding does the reverse: it takes what would, without it, exist merely within the cognitive faculty as a modification of it and makes it an object outside that faculty.” (endnote 4 (Chapter 1), p.176)

    This passage shows Maimon’s brilliance in giving a striking picture of the essence of CPR in just one sentence. Cognition is a double movement, a wave, the forms of sensibility carry in, the syntheses by means of the categories throw back out.

    3. “Perhaps one day there will be an object that I perceive but not in space (or in time)” (endnote 5, p.177)

    Here Humean scepticism is let loose and seems to put the transcendental status of space and time, that Mikhail wonders about, completely into doubt: How can I conclude from the fact that every object I have perceived so far has been in space that every object in general must be?

    SPACE & DIFFERENCE The notion that space as concept is difference, and that space as intuition is a sensible representation of difference is, I think, a fundamental innovation of the chapter and of the whole book – not Kant, not Leibniz – pure Maimon.

    I find Maimon’s discussions of space and difference the most novel and most difficult in the book. By way of broaching discussion of this issue, suppose Kant and Leibniz were arguing up in Heaven and Leibniz said:

    ‘You say that space and time are the forms of our sensibility, they belong to our faculty of cognition whereas sensations are given to us from without. Now what I don’t understand is how you think sensations are brought under these forms. For if what we are given is non-spatio-temporal, then it is either one or manifold. If it is one than I do not see that any principle for making it spatio-temporal is possible, and if it is manifold, that is to say differentiated, then you need a principle for mapping the differences onto space and time. For example, if what is given is red and green how is it decided that the red is to the left of the green and not vice-versa? or that the red came before the green and not after it? I have been mocked for arguing that this is the best of all possible worlds, but what I meant by this is to propose that the world is organized to achieve a maximum of continuity. Now it seems to me that only a principle such as this could take you from a manifold of different sensations to a particular ordering of them in space and time. This is why Herr Maimon is right to suggest (chapter 8, s.77) that the principle of continuity is an a priori principle that your transcendental philosophy requires. Finally, in your Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection you attack me for claiming that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles applies to the sensible world. You would say there is no reason why two identical peas should not lie side by side in a pod. But I reply that your own theory counts against this, for if two non-spatio-temporal sensations are identical then we are agreed that they are not two but one, but to be placed side by side they must first be distinguished from one other, contrary to the hypothesis.’

    How would Kant respond?

  9. Ok, I am at long last getting to this. This is an excellent summary of Chapter 1, Mikhail.

    One thing that occured to me–and I have to think more about it–is the manner in which Maimon approaches his criticism, or better, his “sharpening” of the apriority of time/space from the skeptical position. In the fourth paralogism Kant puts representations of bodies on the same plane as representations of ourselves, however, in the updated scheme in the refutation, representation of things in space are, I think, prior to the representation of ourselves. This, Kant thinks, unravles the argument for skeptical idealism. The linchpin to all of this is the claim that we are conscious of ourselves as determined in time. That is, it’s us that represent, well, ourselves as having mental states that occur in a particular order, e.g. one after another. Kant, of course, insists that such order can’t be determined by reference to me alone, we need some sort of reference to something persistent. For Kant, only things in space can manage this. So, perception is a necessary condition for me to “represent/determine/be conscious of” myself (awkward I know, but I’m under the gun here and I don’t have the Kdrv in front of me). Yet, this is kind of a weird argument.

    For one, why isn’t inner intuition good enough to determine the order of my mental life? I could take the Cartesian route here and point out that there is a before and after when a dream. Or, we could take aim from a different direction and ask if Kant is right about the idea that we are aware of ourselves in time. Is this reliant on the mere observation of a before and after? Why do we need something outside that persists then? So, ok, here’s a question (going along with Mikhail’s (1) and (3) above: Is there any type of sensibility that is severed from space and time, but nonetheless, possible? Clearly this challenges Kant’s “space is in me” business from the Fourth Paralogism. To back up for a moment, isn’t Kant’s basic move in the 4th paralogism toshow that transcendental realism backslides into some sort of idealism? So, following Kant, for one, there are a priori arguments that attempt to show that the concept of an object, or better, a material thing or any one thing or another in space is contradictory. Enter dogmatic idealism. Alternatively, if we attempt to prove the existence of bodies/objects etc in space a posteriori, that is, by reasoning from perception as effect to bodies as their cause, well, we’re back to Hume, and it’s here where I think we also find Maimon. So, I suppose my questions are (1) is this is plausible and (2) what does Maimon “take” from Hume? I think Maimon’s debt to Hume is clear here, but the critique of Kant is launched from a rather different place, I think, perhaps it’s indebted to his interest in mathematics–which is something Mikhail has been coming back to I think as well, and is going to “haunt” this whole discussion of the Essay, esp, infinite understanding. Anyway, just some observations, but (obviously) Maimon seems to be kicking open a door Kant thought closed, viz., idealism. And a rather robust form of idealism at that. Clearly, the infulence on German Idealism (and really Fichte) is clear, but I kind of want to–as hard as it may be–take Maimon on his own terms, rather than as a bridge from say, Kant to Hegel, or whatnot…

  10. I suspect we never get perfect consistency from any thinker. This may be because of “human frailty,” or the inevitable snags the medium of language puts in our way, or because (as I think) the issues themselves are in some measure intractable (well, actually, I think all three of these). So I agree with Nick Midgley that nailing down Maimon’s precise and consistent position is not the most important thing (though it can help us to clarify and avoid misunderstandings).

    Reading Nick’s comment back-to-back with Mike Toule’s sparked something for me, which I hope won’t take us far off topic. Mike writes,

    “before Kant, we could easily speak of “subjects” relating to “objects” … but after Kant we certainly have realized that in order to do so, we must have a point of reference outside of both subjects and objects (God’s point of view, if you will) and, having no such place/point, we must forever abandon the metaphysical project of figuring out the relationship between “I” or “I think” or “subject” or “self” etc etc and the objects/things/world.”

    Nick quotes Maimon:

    ” ‘Perhaps one day there will be an object that I perceive but not in space (or in time)’ “

    and he comments,

    “Here Humean scepticism is let loose and seems to put the transcendental status of space and time…completely into doubt: How can I conclude from the fact that every object I have perceived so far has been in space that every object in general must be?”

    Now I want to ask: what is the difference between these two scenarios? Why is it impossible to imagine “God’s eye view” beyond subject & object but not a perspective outside space &/or time? Is it because the very notion of “view” entails (analytically, as it were) subject-hood, but only synthetically– or even metaphorically (“view” is a metaphor) — space & time? After all, Maimon is making a thought-experiment (he can’t actually tell us what such an experience would be like, except negatively).

    The note Nick is quoting goes on:

    “We have no ground to elevate the generality of this representation [of space], produced a posteriori” through induction, to an a priori necessity. This cannot be compared to a contradiction, where we are convinced that it can never be thought because we already recognize a contradiction in the signs alone….in [that] case we recognize the impossibility. In our case we merely do not recognize the possibility.” (p 177)

    This seems to address the point, though of course it does not mean that Maimon has in mind my question. But am I just incorrigibly Wittgensteinian to say that “recognizing the impossibility” and “not recognizing the possibility” seem to me to shade into each other?

  11. “Why is it impossible to imagine “God’s eye view” beyond subject & object but not a perspective outside space &/or time?”

    I think once we get to Maimon’s more pronounced metaphysical ideas, it’ll be clear that neither is impossible for him (all that business of “infinite understanding”) – as for Kant, we cannot imagine a point outside of space/time because imagination as part of our cognition only works in space/time.

    The business of “God’s eye view” I think is available only by analogy – we imagine someone like us, looking at subjects and objects – which is basically imposing human cognitive capacities on non-human agents (the same works for hammers and nails)…

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